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Abstract: As wireless sensor networks are usually deployed in unattended areas, security 
policies cannot be updated in a timely fashion upon identification of new attacks. This 
gives enough time for attackers to cause significant damage. Thus, it is of great importance 
to provide protection from unknown attacks. However, existing solutions are mostly 
concentrated on known attacks. On the other hand, mobility can make the sensor network 
more resilient to failures, reactive to events, and able to support disparate missions with a 
common set of sensors, yet the problem of security becomes more complicated. In order to 
address the issue of security in networks with mobile nodes, we propose a machine 
learning solution for anomaly detection along with the feature extraction process that tries 
to detect temporal and spatial inconsistencies in the sequences of sensed values and the 
routing paths used to forward these values to the base station. We also propose a special 
way to treat mobile nodes, which is the main novelty of this work. The data produced in 
the presence of an attacker are treated as outliers, and detected using clustering techniques. 
These techniques are further coupled with a reputation system, in this way isolating 
compromised nodes in timely fashion. The proposal exhibits good performances at 
detecting and confining previously unseen attacks, including the cases when mobile nodes 
are compromised. 
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; mobility; unknown attacks; clustering algorithms; 
reputation systems 
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1. Introduction 
 
The development of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) was mainly motivated by military 
applications, such as control and surveillance in battlefields, but over time their deployment has been 
introduced to other areas, i.e., industrial control and monitoring, environmental monitoring, health 
monitoring of patients or assistance to disabled people and the emerging field of ambient intelligence. 
In all of the applications, it is mandatory to maintain the integrity and the correct operation of the 
deployed network. Furthermore, WSNs are often deployed in unattended or even hostile environments, 
making their securing even more challenging. In addition, the trends in the recent past are to include 
mobile nodes, since this can make the WSN more resilient to failures, reactive to events, provide better 
coverage of the monitored area, and able to support disparate missions with a common set of sensors. 
However, mobility additionally complicates the security issue. 
WSNs consist of huge numbers of sensor nodes, and since this number is huge, the nodes have to be 
very cheap. This further implies that they possess very limited power and computation resources, small 
memory size and limited bandwidth usage. Furthermore, the incorporation of any tamper-resistant 
hardware would assume unacceptable costs. All of this makes the security of these networks very 
challenging, as the resource limited devices cannot support the execution of any complicated 
algorithms. Moreover, WSNs use a radio band that is license-free, so anybody with appropriate 
equipment can listen to the communication. Finally, due to their deployment in areas that are difficult 
to reach makes them prone to node failures and adversaries. 
On the other hand, profound analysis of the state of the art has allowed us to identify the main 
issues of the existing solutions, which are their limited scope of detection, as the majority of them can 
detect only previously seen attacks, and the fact that any adjustment has to done by humans, which 
cannot be done in a timely fashion due to the deployment of the nodes in hard to reach areas. In order 
to overcome these issues, we have proposed an approach based on anomaly detection that is able to 
detect a wide range of attacks, including the previously unseen ones, without the necessity to have any 
previous knowledge on the attacks and their way of operating. Attacks are treated as data outliers, and 
since outliers are defined as something different from the normal, we can classify our approach as an 
anomaly detection one. Thus, the basic premise of this approach is that the attacks are deviations from 
normality. However, not all deviations from normality are attacks, but we believe that they have to be 
reported and examined further. For this reason, in this work we only provide a first reaction to 
anomalies, which is their isolation, but it is assumed that the base station has additional technique to 
decide whether an anomaly can be attributed to an attack, or not. However, this is out of the scope of 
this work. 
The existing anomaly detection solutions mainly look for the deviations in the values of the 
parameters that capture the properties of known attacks, which means that they use so-called numerical 
features. Hence, their possibilities to detect unknown attacks are limited, since it is hard to define the 
numerical features of the unknown attacks. In order to overcome this issue, we have proposed a 
machine learning solution for anomaly detection along with the feature extraction process that does not 
capture the properties of the attacks, but rather relies on the existing temporal and spatial redundancy 
in sensor networks and tries to detect temporal and spatial inconsistencies in the sequences of sensed 
values and the routing paths used to forward these values to the base station. In this work we further 
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propose a special way to integrate mobile nodes into this approach, given that mobility is a big issue in 
anomaly detection, as it can lead to observation data that have long range dependency and in this way 
increase its difficulty. Moreover, it is greatly unexplored and untreated subject in the current state of 
the art. 
The data produced in the presence of an attacker are treated as outliers, and they are detected using 
clustering techniques. The techniques are further coupled with the reputation system, which provides 
implicit response to the attackers, as the compromised nodes get isolated from the network. The 
proposal has been tested in the presence of the attacks that were unknown during the training, 
exhibiting good performances at detecting and confining these attacks. To summarize, the objective of 
this work is to detect unknown attacks in WSNs that contain both static and mobile sensor nodes, 
providing special treatment for the latter ones given their dynamic nature, and provide initial response 
to malicious nodes. The main contribution of this work is the proposal for special treatment of mobile 
nodes, which provides their efficient incorporation in the existing approach, while maintaining high 
performance level. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows: Section 2 gives more details of the state of the art 
solutions. Section 3 details the proposed solution, while Section 4 provides its evaluation. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.  
 
2. Related Work  
 
A number of custom IDSs for sensor networks have been proposed. Some representative solutions 
are given in [1,2]. However, they are mainly focused on misbehaviour detection, and hence are capable 
of detecting only a limited number of attacks, i.e., known attacks and their variations. In order to detect 
new attacks, they need to be adjusted by humans.  
Recently a few solutions that deploy machine learning techniques have appeared [3,4]. Among 
these solutions we can also find a few anomaly-based solutions [5,6], that claim to have the capability 
to detect unknown attacks. They uphold the idea that machine learning techniques offer higher level of 
flexibility and adaptability to the changes of the environment, as it only requires retraining the 
algorithms with new data, which can be done automatically. Furthermore, in reality we often have to 
deal with incomplete and noisy information, and the security requirements themselves are often fuzzy 
and incomplete. Machine learning techniques are known to cope well with these sorts of problems, 
which is the main reason they are becoming part of security solutions, even commercial ones [7].  
However, the feature sets they deploy mostly include those features that capture the properties of 
known attacks, i.e., those that are known to change under the influence of an attacker, or are known to 
be weak spots. This is their major deficiency, as relying on these features only known attacks or their 
variations can be detected. Furthermore, it assumes that an attacker can exploit only the known 
vulnerabilities, but general experience is that vulnerabilities are detected after being exploited by an 
adversary. Some of them assume that the feature sets can be expanded [1], yet this again has to be done 
through a human intervention. In addition, taking into consideration the existence of mobile nodes in 
the network is greatly unexplored and untreated subject in the current state of the art [8]. A summary 
of the most representative existing solutions for intrusion detection is given in Table 1, from which we 
can conclude the following: although there are many proposed solutions, none of them is general 
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enough to be able to handle a greater variety of attacks. For this reason, most of the solutions should 
work aside with few more that address different aspects of security breaches. However, this can 
introduce high overhead and consume significant resources. Another issue is that most of them are able 
to detect known attacks, but the experience from the network security tells us that the attackers always 
manage to find new possibilities to launch their attacks. Finally, almost none of them address 
difficulties introduced by mobile nodes. One example is given in [6], but it just deals with the attacks 
on routing protocols. Furthermore, this work does not assume any special treatment of mobile nodes. 
Thus, our aim is to provide a machine learning based solution that does not suffer from these issues, 
i.e., a solution that would be capable of detecting wide range of attacks, including the previously 
unseen ones, which would also be adaptable automatically and address the existence of mobile nodes 
in the network. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the representative solutions. 
 Lidea [1] SVM [5] ML_FW [9] IDRout [6] H-IDS [2] 
Classification Signature   
Anomaly    
Attack Scope Limited  
General      
Unknown attacks  *   *  
Adaptable 
Yes 
Automatic     
Human Interaction   
No      
Mobility Yes      
No  
* Claimed, not proven. 
 
3. Proposed Solution 
 
3.1. Envisioned WSN Model 
 
We envision wireless sensor networks (Figure 1) where most of the sensor nodes exhibit limited 
resources, but there are also a number of PDA-like sensors with more computational resources, 
memory and battery capacity. There is at least one base station as well. Their number is significantly 
smaller than the number of the “normal” sensors, usually a few orders of magnitude smaller. The 
nodes can organize themselves either in a hierarchical or flat manner. Nodes can be fixed or mobile, 
although it is assumed that the majority of the nodes are fixed. No constrains regarding routing 
protocol are assumed. 
S
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situation is reasonable. Thus, in this case we want to detect temporal inconsistencies in paths used by 
each node.  
The attacks can be either mote-based or laptop-based, but can be either inside or outside based. 
Another assumption is that the attack always starts after the initialization of the network, i.e., the 
network functions normally for some time, which is a very reasonable assumption. 
3.3. Feature Extraction and Formation of Model 
Our idea is to find temporal and/or spatial inconsistencies in sensed data in order to detect 
manipulated data and/or compromised nodes. For this reason, we follow the idea presented in [11,12], 
based on extracted n-grams and their frequencies within different time windows. Thus, the vectors 
used for characterization that allow the deployment of machine learning are composed of the extracted 
n-grams. For the purpose of illustration, we will give a short example for a sensor that detects 
presence. Let a sensor give the following output during the time window of size 20: 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0. If we fix the n-gram size on 3, we extract all the sequences of size 3 each time 
moving one position forward. In this way we can observe the following sequences and the number of  
their occurrences within the time window: 111—occurs six times, 110—two, 100—two, 000—six,  
001—one, 011—one. Thus, the extracted vector that corresponds to this time window contains the 
following features: 111—0.33, 110—0.11, 100—0.11, 000—0.33, 001—0.06, 011—0.06. In our 
model, the sequences are the features and their frequencies are the corresponding feature values. Thus, 
the sum of the feature values is always equal to 1. In our algorithm this characterization, i.e., the 
extraction of vectors, is performed at predefined moments of time and takes the established amount of 
previous data, e.g., we can perform the characterization after every 20 time periods based on the 
previous 40 values. 
In a similar fashion, we form features for spatial characterization. The first step is to establish 
vicinities of nodes that historically have been giving consistent information. Furthermore, since an 
agent is supposed to reside on a node, vicinities are established using the nodes whose information can 
reach the agent. In this way, an n-gram for spatial characterization in a moment of time is made of the 
sensor outputs from that very moment. For example, if sensors S1, S2, S3 that belong to the same 
group each give the following output: 1 1 1 0 during four time epochs, we characterize them with the 
following set of n-grams (each n-gram contains at the first position the value of S1, the value of S2  
at the second and the value of S3 at the third at a certain time epoch): 111—occurs three times,  
000—occurs once, thus the feature value of each n-gram is: 111—0.75, 000—0.25, i.e., the 
frequencies within the observed period of time.  
We develop the same principle for characterizing routes that a node has been using to send its 
sensed data to the sink. Each routing hop adds its ID to the message that is further forwarded, so the 
sink has the information about the routing path together with the message. However, this is not 
performed with each message in order to avoid the overhead in the communication channel. Yet, 
considering that one routing path is usually used more than once, it is reasonable to assume that the 
sink will have all the paths used for routing the data from a certain sensor. As previously mentioned, 
each sensor has its own model and each feature, i.e., n-gram in the model consists of a predefined 
number of successive hops used in routing information coming from the node. For example, if during 
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the characterization time, the node has used the following paths for routing its data to the sink:  
A-B-C-S—three times, A-D-E-F-S—two times, A-B-E-F-S—one time (A—the node that is sending 
the data, B, C, … —other nodes in the network, S—sink), we can characterize the routing with the 
following n-grams (n = 3): ABC, BCS, ADE, DEF, EFS, ABE and BEF. In all of the routes, the  
n-gram ABC occurs three times, BCS—three, ADE—two, DEF—two, EFS—three, ABE—one,  
BEF—one. The total number of n-grams is 15, so dividing the values given above with 15, we get the 
frequencies of each n-gram which are the values that we assign to our features, i.e., n-grams. 
3.4. Deployed Distance Function 
Since some of the n-grams can appear more than once, it is obvious that the extracted vectors will 
not be of constant size. Thus, we cannot use standard distance functions. The distance between the 
instances of the presented model is taken from [13]. It is designed to calculate the distance between 
two sequences. We have elected this one (among all those given in [13]) since it is proven to be the 
most efficient in the terms of the absolute execution time. 
3.5. Scope of Attacks Covered with the Approach 
As previously mentioned, we treat attacks as data outliers and deploy clustering techniques, namely 
SOM, unsupervised GA and Growing Neural Gas (GNG). Further details on the algorithm 
implementation can be found in [12,14,15], while their distributed organization will be described in 
more detail in Section 3.7. In the following we will explain the principles of the approach. It is 
important to mention here that the algorithms can be trained with both clean and “unclean” data 
(contains traces of attacks). Furthermore, the algorithms are constantly retrained in order to decrease 
time lags between model training and model application. The retraining frequency depends on the 
dynamics of the underlying sensor network. 
There are two approaches for detecting outliers using clustering techniques [16] depending on the 
following two possibilities: detecting outlying clusters or detecting outlying data that belong to  
non-outlying clusters. For the first case, we calculate the average distance of each cluster to the rest of 
the clusters (or its closest neighborhood) (MD). In the latter case, we calculate quantization error (QE) 
of each input as the distance from its corresponding cluster center. 
The attacks that can be detected with the proposed approach are those that introduce changes into 
either the sensed value that is forwarded to the base station or the routing paths. These changes will 
result in different distribution of the extracted n-grams. However, if we take frequencies as feature 
values, the sum of the feature values remain the same, i.e., 1, so we can write the following equation: 
∑
=
=Δ
N
i
if
0
0  (1)  
where N is the total number of the extracted n-grams and Δfi is the change of the feature value of the  
n-gram i. On the other hand, according to the distance function [13], the introduced change in distance 
between the attacked instance and any other is: 
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ΔD=∑
=
Δ
N
i
if
1
 (2)  
In essence, this is the change introduced in the above defined QE or/and MD values. Thus, the 
following inequality defines the changes introduced by the attacks: 
th
N
i
i ff >Δ∑
=1
 (3)  
where fth is the threshold value used to distinguish attacks from normal situations. 
Now we will see how the changes introduced by the attacker affect the feature values. Bearing in 
mind that each sensed value or routing hop participates in n features, where n is the size of the  
n-gram, if the attacker changes one value, the values of 2n (at most) features will be changed [the 
values of newly created n-grams (n at most) with the change will increase, while the values of those 
that existed before the change (again n at most) will decrease]. For example, the third element in the 
sequence …1 0 0 1 1… for n = 3 participates in three n-grams: 100, 001 and 011. However, if the 
attacker changes this value into 1, the sequence becomes …1 0 1 1 1…, in which case the third 
element participates in these n-grams: 101, 011 and 111. This results in decreased occurrences of the 
n-grams 100 and 001, while the occurrences of the 101 and 011 become increased (011 appears in both 
cases, so its total occurrence remains the same). In total, the occurrence of four n-grams is changed. 
For these reasons, if the attacker introduces Nerr change in the sample of the size Nsample, the value of 
ΔD will range between 0 (in the case the changes are symmetric, so the effect of one change cancels 
the effect of another and the distribution does not change at the end), and the value that corresponds to 
the case when the effects of each change are completely uncorrelated, so they sum together, which is 
given with the following formula: 
sample
err
err N
nNfnD 2*2max ==  (4)  
Thus, having in mind the correlation of the n-grams, in order to model this change that ranges from 
0 to Dmax we use the next formula: 
( ) ( ) αββρ keF −+= 1  (5)  
where α = 1 – 1/ρ, β(<1, since the function should grow with ρ) and k are constants defined in the 
design process (the specific meaning of both will be explained later in this section) and ρ is the 
coefficient of total correlation between the n-grams. The value of F(ρ) is β for ρ = 0, (the reason for 
this will be explained in the following), and 1 for ρ = 1. 
The coefficient of total correlation [17] expresses the amount of dependency that exists among a set 
of variables. For a given set of k random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xk, the total correlation C(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) 
is given by the following formula: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
−=
k
i
kik XXXHXHXXXC
1
2121 ,...,,,...,,  (6)  
where H(Xi) is the information entropy of variable Xi, while H(X1, X2, …, Xk) is the joint entropy of the 
variable set {X1, X2, …, Xk}. In our case, the variables are the extracted n-grams. For the sake of 
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calculating the above formula, their distribution can be approximated either as a common distribution 
depending on the purpose of the deployed sensor network, or using the historical data sensed by  
the network. 
Regarding the value of β, we have to take into account that the higher the value of β is, the function 
becomes closer to its asymptotic function F(ρ) = 1. Thus, the effect of ρ becomes smaller. Similar 
stands for the value of k. As k → 0, the function becomes closer to the same asymptotic function. In 
the opposite case, as k → ∞, the function reaches its asymptote: F(ρ) = 0 for ρ < 1, F(ρ) = 1 for ρ = 1. 
In both cases the effect of ρ becomes less significant. 
Finally, we get the following formula: 
( ) th
sample
err f
N
nNF >2ρ  (7)  
which gives us the minimal number of changes the attacker has to introduce in order to be detected by 
the approach: 
( ) th
sample
err fnF
N
N
ρ2min
=  (8)  
In the previous equation we have the following degrees of freedom: Nsample, n and fth. Lower 
characterization periods (Nsample) and the threshold on one side and higher n on the other give us the 
opportunity to detect the attacker even if he introduces very few changes. However, this can also result 
in higher false positive rate, so a tradeoff between higher detection and lower false positive rate has to 
be established. This depends on many factors, such as the application of the deployed WSN or the 
existing redundancy. Also, the values of both β and k indirectly affect on this value through F(ρ). As 
the value of β increases or the value of k decreases, the value of F(ρ) for the same ρ increases, which 
further decreases the value of Nerrmin. In opposite cases, as the value of β decreases or the value of k 
increases, the value Nerrmin will increase. 
The previous formula also helps us to define the minimal value of β. It derives form the constraint 
that the maximal possible value of Nerrmin is equal to Nsample. For the same reason, F(ρ) has to be 
different than 0 for ρ = 0 (in the opposite case, Nerrmin → ∞). This results in following: 
th
err
sample f
nN
N
min2
>β  (9)  
3.6. Recovery from Attacks 
Every sensor node is being examined by agents that execute one of the algorithms for detecting 
attacks, which reside on nodes in its vicinity and listen to its communication. The agents are trained 
separately. The system of agents is coupled with a reputation system [18] where each node has its 
reputation value that basically reflects the level of confidence that others have in it based on its 
previous behavior. In our proposal, the output of an agent affects the reputation system in such a way 
that it assigns lower reputation to the nodes where it detects abnormal activities and vice versa. We 
further advocate avoiding any kind of interaction with the low-reputation nodes: to discard any data or 
request coming from these nodes or to avoid taking them as a routing hop. In this way, compromised 
nodes remain isolated from the network and have no role in its further performance. After this, 
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additional actions can be performed by the base station, e.g., it can revoke the keys from the 
compromised nodes, reprogram them, etc.  
In this work the reputation is calculated in the following way: fth is taken to be 1 for the following 
reasons. Considering that the attacks will often result in the creation of new n-grams, it is reasonable to 
assume that the extracted vector in the presence of attackers will not be a subset of any vector 
extracted in normal situation, thus the distance will never be lower than 1. We further define two 
reputation values, repQE and repMD based on the previously defined QE and MD values and 
afterwards joint reputation rep used for updating overall reputation based on these two values: 
if (QE < 1) { repQE = 1; } 
else { repQE = 1 - QE/2; } 
if (MD < 1) { repMD = 1; } 
else { repMD = 1 - MD/2; } 
The value (rep) for updating overall reputation is calculated in the following way: 
if (QE > 1) { rep = repQE; } 
else { rep = repMD; } 
There are two functions for updating the overall reputation of the node, depending whether the 
current reputation is below or above the established threshold that distinguishes normal and anomalous 
behavior. If the current reputation is above the threshold and the node starts behaving suspiciously, its 
reputation will fall quickly. On the other hand, if the reputation is lower than the established threshold, 
and the node starts behaving properly, it will need to behave properly for some time until it reaches the 
threshold in order to “redeem” itself. The first objective is provided by the function x + log(1.2x). 
Finally, the reputation is updated in the following way: 
if (last_rep[node] > threshold) { 
new_rep[node] = last_rep[node] + rep + log(1.2 * rep); }  
else {  
new_rep[node] = last_rep[node] + c_limit * (rep + log(1.2 * rep)); } 
The second objective is provided by the coefficient c_limit, which takes values lower than 1 and its 
purpose is to limit selective behavior of a node by decreasing the reputation growth if the reputation 
value is below the threshold. Very low values of this coefficient obligate nodes to behave properly 
most of time. If the final reputation value falls out from the [0, 1] range, it is rounded to 0 if it is lower 
than 0 or to 1 in the opposite case. The threshold value can be set to the middle of the reputation value 
range (50 in our case) at the starting point. However, this value depends on many different factors. One 
of the most important factors is risk, and the threshold value is proportional to it: if the operation in the 
network (or in some of its parts) is critical, the threshold value should be higher, and vice versa. Thus, 
a process that evaluates risk should be able to update the threshold value.  
However, if during the testing of temporal coherence, we get normal data different from those that 
the clustering algorithms saw during the training, it is possible to get high QE value as well. On the 
other hand, the spatial coherence should not detect any anomalies. Thus, the final reputation will fall 
only if both spatial and temporal algorithms detect anomalies. In the opposite case, its reputation will 
not change significantly. This is implemented in the following way: 
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if (value_rep <  threshold) { 
if (space_rep <  threshold) { 
result = value_rep; 
} else { result = 1 - value_rep; } 
} else { 
result = value_rep;  } 
where value rep is the reputation assigned by the algorithms for temporal characterization and space 
rep is the reputation assigned by the algorithms for spatial characterization. On the other hand, as 
mentioned in the previous text, in the situations such as the data coming from a node exhibits large 
variations, temporal inconsistencies are not likely to be detected. However, spatial inconsistencies are 
very likely to be detected. Thus, spatial inconsistence is sufficient in order to raise an alarm.  
Concerning the detection of routing protocol anomalies, the explained approach can tell us if there 
is something suspicious in routing paths of a certain node. Yet, in order to find out the nodes that are 
the origin of the attack, we need to add one more step. In this second step, if the reputation of the 
routes calculated in the previous step is lower than the established threshold, the hops that participated 
in the bad routes will be added to the global list of bad nodes, or if they already exist, the number of 
their appearance in bad routes is increased. The similar principle is performed for the correct nodes. 
For each node, let the number of its appearances in bad routes be nBad and the number of its 
appearances in good routes be nGood. Finally, if nGood is greater than nBad, the node keeps its 
reputation value, and in the opposite case, it is assigned the following reputation value: 
nBadnGood
nGood
+
 (10) 
In this way, as the bad node spreads its malicious behavior, its reputation will gradually decrease. 
3.7. Distributed Organization of Detectors 
Given the distributed nature of WSNs, the detection should be organized in a distributed manner as 
well. In our approach detectors are implemented as software agents and they reside on physical nodes. 
It is important to notice that machine learning techniques have many parameters that should be set 
from the start, e.g., duration of training, size of the lattice in the case of SOM, crossover and mutation 
probabilities in the case of GA, etc. It is not easy to guess the optimal parameters a priori, and in our 
case an additional problem is the impossibility of human interaction. Moreover, in the case where an 
agent resides on a compromised node, it is possible for the attacker to compromise the agent as well. 
We consider that additional security measures that protect the agent from the host (and vice versa)  
are taken, such as those proposed in [19], so agent subversion is not a straightforward process. The 
detailed explanation of these techniques is out of the scope of this work. 
In order to overcome these issues, we introduce agent redundancy, where more than one agent 
monitors the same node. Each physical node may contain more than one agent. In the beginning we 
have a group of agents that implement one of the proposed algorithms with different parameter 
settings. Every node is being examined by an agent that resides on another node in its vicinity and 
which promiscuously listens to its communication. Each of the agents is trained separately. Final 
decision can be made either applying majority voting, or a weighted sum, where each weight depends 
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on the “quality” of each agent. A simple and efficient way of calculating this quality could be to 
introduce agent reputation (in this way we would have a hierarchical reputation system, where the 
agents would assign reputation to the nodes, while there will also exist a reputation system 
implemented in the base station for the agents as well). This reputation can be calculated using beta 
function [20], which has strong background in the statistics theory: 
( )( )
1
11,1
++
+
=++= βα
αβαBetaER  (11) 
where α stands for the number of correct decisions made by the detector, while β stands for the  
number of incorrect ones. The voting system decides whether a response is right or wrong based on 
majority voting. 
3.8. Incorporation of Mobile Nodes 
Mobile nodes introduce additional alterations in the system, making the detection process more 
complicating. However, the presence of mobile nodes should not affect the proper functioning of the 
WSN, i.e., they should be able to sense the environment, continue sending their own sensed values and 
be used as a routing hop in forwarding sensed values of other nodes as well. Due to their special 
nature, these nodes require special treatment in the proposed detection system.  
In order to minimize the disruption of the detection system, we propose the following principle: if 
the nodes encounter with a new node in their area, they will ask the base station about its reputation 
and continue the interaction assuming the existing reputation value. Concerning a mobile node that has 
changed the position, we distinguish two possible situations: the node remains in the same area, i.e., it 
has not changed its position significantly, which can be concluded by the base station if it still uses 
similar group of nodes to route its data, or if it starts using completely new routes, the old model has to 
be discarded and a new model has to be established and trained for the same node. This goes for both 
models: the one based on sensed values, i.e., if a node has changed its position significantly, it is very 
probable that sensed values will be different, thus a model has to be established by performing the 
training with new data, and also the one based on routing information. 
Regarding the nodes whose routes will be changed with the introduction of a new node that behaves 
properly, according to the presented model and the adopted distance function, it is not possible to 
introduce significant change so as to raise doubts, thus it is not necessary to perform the re-training. 
However, if more new nodes appear in the routes, it is advisable to perform the re-training (with both 
old and new data) in order to avoid false positives. 
4. Experimental Evaluation 
4.1. Simulation Environment 
The proposed approach has been tested on a simulator of sensor networks developed by our 
research group and designed using the C++ programming language. We have decided to design a 
simulator mainly because there is no available testbed for security applications in sensor networks. 
Attacking recorded data from a testbed does not significantly differ from the simulation. What’s more, 
the available testbeds for wireless sensor networks contain a relatively small number of sensors (100 at 
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most), in which case the data obtained from our simulator are more complex (simply because there are 
more sensors). For these reasons, we believe that until a testbed for security applications in WSNs 
appears, a simulator is a better choice for testing security applications. We further evaluated two  
well-known WSN simulators, ns-2 [21] and Castalia [22] over Omnet++ [23]. Yet, we eventually 
decided to implement our own simulator, TRSSim. This simulator implements only the basic 
functionality of the communication layers, rather than implementing all layers in detail, which anyhow 
is not very important for our application. This significantly reduces the total simulation time, which 
was our main reason for implementing the simulator. In the following we will describe the 
characteristics of the simulator that are pertinent for understanding the results of this work. The 
experiments, however, do not rely on any TRSSim-specific data or constraint and they can be 
replicated easily with other simulators. 
The network is organized as clusters of close sensors where each group has its cluster head, as is 
often done in real networks in order to reduce computational overhead and energy consumption. 
Cluster heads are the only sensors that can participate in the communication between different clusters 
and also in routing. The mobility model is random-based, i.e., nodes can move randomly in any 
direction towards a random destination, with the restriction of the maximal distance between the 
current position and the destination. The maximal distance in our case is 20% of the distance between 
the current node position and the base station in order to avoid the situation where the node ends up at 
the position of the base station. 
In this work we will present the results based on the Sybil attacks [10], where the malicious node 
pretends to have multiple IDs, either false, i.e., fabricated, or impersonated from other legitimate 
nodes, i.e., stolen IDs. Added malicious nodes send random values that may or may not coincide with 
the values sent by the original good nodes. Since in this work we are dealing with unknown attacks, 
clustering algorithms are trained with data that have no trace of attacks. The performance of the 
approach when attacks are present during the training can be found in our previous work [11,14,16]. 
Thus, we can say that the attack is unknown to the algorithm. In our work both Sybil nodes and the 
compromised nodes whose IDs have been stolen are treated as malicious. Although the compromised 
nodes do not perform any malicious activity, we believe they should remain isolated until the security 
response system deals with the attack, e.g., until the base station changes their ID. 
The proposed algorithm has been tested on the presented simulated sensor network that contains 40 
sensor nodes that can be placed in 100 different positions. The network simulates a sensor network for 
detecting presence in the area of application. The groups for spatial characterization are formed in the 
following way: close sensors that should give the same output are placed in the same group. 
The duration of the experiment is 1000 time ticks. One time tick in simulator is the period of time 
required to perform the necessary operations in the network, and it is equivalent to a sampling period, 
or time epoch in sensor networks. In the following we will present results in different scenarios 
varying the attack strength.  
4.2. Results 
In order to illustrate the performance of the algorithm, in the first experiment the Sybil node is static 
(it is added at the position 26) and it has the valid ID of a mobile node. In Figure 2(a,b), we can 
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observe from different angles that the reputations of both the Sybil node at the position 26 and the 
compromised mobile node have been significantly lowered, which means that we have successfully 
detected and confined the attack. In Figure 2(c), we present the top view, where we can distinguish the 
path of the compromised mobile node due to its decreased reputation.  
Figure 2. Reputation Evolution in Time and Space—Different Views.  
 
(a) 3D (b) 3D 
(c) Top view—2D 
In the following experiments we will gradually increase the number of compromised nodes, 
increasing as well the number of attacked mobile nodes. In Figure 3 we present the dependence of the 
average detection rate of the percentage of the malicious nodes.  
Figure 3. Detection Rate vs. % of Malicious Nodes. 
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As we can observe, with the proposed approach we can detect the attack if up to 80% of the nodes 
are malicious, and completely confine it (i.e., achieve 100% detection rate) if up to 52% of the nodes 
are malicious. It is also important to mention than in all the experiments the false positive rate was 0%. 
In Figure 4 we show how the time of detection and the complete isolation of the attack depend on 
the total number of malicious nodes in the network. As we can observe, the attack cannot be isolated if 
more than 58% of the nodes are malicious, nor it can be detected if more than 80% of the nodes are 
malicious. On the other hand, if up to 20% of the nodes are malicious, the attack is detected and 
confined in the same moment, which is due to the fact that the great majority of nodes are still 
behaving properly and it is not complicated to distinguish the misbehaving ones. As the attack 
becomes more aggressive, it is harder to detect and isolate all the misbehaving nodes. 
Figure 4. Detection and Isolation Time. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this work we have proposed a machine learning based anomaly detection approach for detecting 
unknown attacks in wireless sensor networks. We have also proposed a way to integrate mobile nodes 
in the approach, which is the main novelty of this work. The attacks are treated as data outliers, and we 
have designed clustering algorithms for outlier detection. The algorithms are further coupled with a 
reputation system, which provides implicit response to attackers, as low reputation nodes remain 
isolated from the network. Our experiments confirm that the approach is capable of detecting and 
completely confining attacks that were unknown to the algorithms during the training, with no false 
positives, and even in the cases mobile nodes have been attacked. We were able to achieve 100% 
detection rate of up to 52% of the nodes were malicious, and detect the presence of the attack if up to 
80% of the nodes are malicious. 
In the future we plan on broadening the scope of attacks our approach can detect by  
addressing attacks that compromise mobility patterns, which can make the approach helpful in 
detecting attacks in cellular networks or in detection of mobile intruders in the monitored area in 
surveillance applications [24]. 
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